Hungary Elections 2026

Will the End of the Orbán Era Restore Unanimity in the European Union?

I. New Balances in Hungary

In the parliamentary elections held in Hungary on 12 April 2026, the Tisza Party led by Péter Magyar won 138 seats in the 199-member National Assembly, thereby securing the two-thirds majority required to amend the Constitution. As a result, Fidesz, led by Viktor Orbán and in power since 2010, lost its parliamentary majority for the first time.

According to the election results, while the Tisza Party achieved a constitutional majority on its own, Fidesz remained at 55 seats. This outcome points not only to a change of government, but also to a new period capable of producing constitutional and institutional consequences in terms of the scope of the legislative majority. In this respect, the election is significant not merely because executive power changed hands in Hungary, but also because it reshaped the country’s constitutional capacity for legal action and the parliamentary balance.

Under Hungarian constitutional law, a two-thirds majority provides a broader legal capacity for action than ordinary legislative activity. This majority is of particular importance for amending laws, adopting or modifying regulations in certain constitutionally protected areas that require a special majority, and exercising influence in specific constitutional or institutional appointment processes. For this reason, the election result should be assessed not only as a change in the executive, but also in terms of the impact of the legislative majority on the constitutional order. Although the Tisza Party, like the previous ruling party, is situated within a centre-right political line, it has, unlike its predecessor, adopted a reform-oriented approach emphasising the strengthening of institutional relations with the European Union. This, in turn, indicates that certain constitutional and legislative alignment measures may come onto the agenda in the new period.

II. European Union Law and Institutional Alignment

The significance of the election results from the perspective of European Union law arises particularly within the framework of decision-making procedures and institutional alignment mechanisms within the Union. Within the European Union, decisions in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy are, as a rule, subject to the principle of unanimity. This structure allows each member state to exercise individual influence in certain areas of decision-making. In the past, Hungary was the state that most frequently blocked EU decisions, with 21 vetoes. For this reason, Hungary’s approach to these mechanisms in the new period is of institutional importance for the functioning of internal EU decision-making processes. In particular, the special procedures laid down in the treaties concerning foreign policy and sanctions regimes render the positions of member states not merely political, but also legally consequential.

From the perspective of financial law, the process should be examined within the framework of conditionality mechanisms aimed at protecting the European Union budget. Hungary’s access to European Union funds is linked to the fulfilment of specific reform measures, institutional standards, and the expectations of the European Commission. According to the official statements of the European Commission concerning Hungary, the country’s recovery and resilience plan includes numerous reform and investment components, and the implementation of this plan is contingent upon the fulfilment of certain milestones and targets. In this context, the broad legislative capacity held by the new parliament provides a technical possibility for carrying out the legal and institutional arrangements deemed necessary by other EU member states.

III. Hungary’s Political Structure

Form of Government: Unicameral parliamentary republic.
Head of State: The President of the Republic is an office representing the unity of the state and primarily performs ceremonial functions. The office does not play a decisive political role in the day-to-day functioning of the executive.
Executive: Executive power is exercised by the government and the prime minister formed by the political force holding the parliamentary majority. The prime minister is the effective centre of executive authority within the political system, and the government is accountable to parliament.
Legislature: Legislative power is exercised by the unicameral National Assembly (Országgyűlés). The Assembly consists of 199 members elected for a four-year term.
Electoral System: Hungary applies a mixed electoral system. 106 members of parliament are elected from single-member constituencies, while 93 are elected from national party lists. A two-thirds majority in parliament is of particular importance for constitutional amendments and certain constitutional and institutional arrangements.
Administrative Structure: The country displays a centralised administrative structure. This increases the influence of the central government over local administrations, budget allocation, and public governance.
Judiciary: Judicial authority is exercised by independent courts. Constitutional review is carried out by the Constitutional Court.

Prepared by: Ahmet Deveci

Bibliography:

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/12/hungary-election-early-results-show-magyars-tisza-ahead-of-orbans-fidesz

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/13/who-is-peter-magyar-hungarys-new-leader-who-trounced-viktor-orban

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/magyar-wins-general-elections-in-hungary-against-incumbent-orban/3903176

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/how-does-the-council-vote/unanimity/

https://reforms-investments.ec.europa.eu/hungarys-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/once-inspired-by-orban-hungarys-peter-magyar-unseats-him-landmark-election-2026-04-12/

In this context, the process accelerated as the elections were moved from April 2026 to February 2026 and the timetable was announced on 11 December 2025. The general election was held simultaneously with a constitutional referendum on 12 February 2026. The elections drew particular attention because they were conducted in the aftermath of a revolution in which social dynamics—especially those under the age of 30—were decisive.

Election Process: Turnout, Security Measures, and the Referendum

According to the Election Commission, turnout in the 12 February election and referendum was announced as 59.44%. With 127,711,793 registered voters, approximately 75.9 million cast ballots. Of the 59 registered parties, 50 participated along with independents; a total of 2,028 candidates competed for 299 parliamentary seats.

The interim administration took extensive measures to ensure election security and public order. Restrictions on mobile banking transactions before the vote, the surrender of licensed firearms, and a ban on motorcycles entering traffic were among the most notable steps. On election day, more than 100,000 soldiers and around 200,000 police officers were deployed; transparency was increased by using camera monitoring at a large share of polling stations.

In the referendum held simultaneously with the election, a package of reforms was put to a vote, including a bicameral legislature, increasing women’s representation, strengthening judicial independence, and limiting the prime minister to two terms. The package was adopted with 68.6% “Yes.”

POLITICAL COMPETITION AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE ELECTION

Bangladesh’s February 2026 elections took place in a climate where “normal politics” and the post-revolution agenda of accountability / transitional justice advanced simultaneously. For this reason, the campaign was shaped not only around economic promises or social policies, but also around rebuilding state capacity after 2024, the credibility of institutions, and the legitimacy of the political order.

The most contested issue of the elections was the exclusion of the Awami League (AL) from the electoral process. Historically playing a decisive role in Bangladesh’s separation from Pakistan and attainment of independence and defining itself as secular and social democratic, the Awami League in recent years lost a significant portion of its social legitimacy due to growing criticism of authoritarianism and its governing practice. This trajectory culminated when the pro-democracy mass movement of July 2024 became a “political rupture,” and the Awami League was removed from power. The interim administration announced that the party had been banned in May 2025 in a manner covering all its activities, stating that the decision was taken within the framework of national security assessments and investigations linked to the violent incidents during the 2024 period. This increased criticism regarding the equality of electoral competition and the representative quality of the contest; for some, it made the election resemble a race with “incomplete competition.” On the other hand, the interim administration defended the step as necessary to “protect the post-revolution order” and to “remove from politics structures implicated in violence.”

With the Awami League absent, political competition largely intensified among the BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and new/alliance actors such as the National Citizens Party (NCP), whose visibility increased after the revolution. A common theme in campaign rhetoric was the “Spirit of July”: reform, anti-corruption, transparency in public administration, and holding the previous period to account found resonance—at different tones—across nearly all actors. In this sense, the election turned into a contest to “set the institutional course of the new period.”

Another key factor that hardened political competition was the growing intersection of “prosecution and politics” in the post-revolution period. The strong public resonance of investigations and judicial proceedings concerning figures from the previous administration moved the campaign beyond classic party rivalry and intertwined it with debates on “transitional justice.” This also split the arguments of those assessing the election’s legitimacy: on one side stood the emphasis on “dismantling the old order,” and on the other, concerns about “representation and pluralism.”

RESULTS: A CHANGE OF POWER AFTER 20 YEARS

According to official statements, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) won 209 of the 300 seats, securing the right to form a government on its own. Jamaat-e-Islami won 68 seats, while the NCP won 6. This outcome was recorded as a turning point in which a long-standing pattern of governance in the country changed through the ballot box.

The political meaning of the results stood out on two levels. First, with the parliamentary majority changing hands, executive power shifted to a new political center. Second, because the referendum was held on the same day, the debate was not limited to the question of “who will govern,” but also brought to the forefront the question of “what kind of institutional architecture” should be built. For this reason, the 2026 election was seen not only as a change of power, but also as a test ground for the new period through the implementability of reforms.

DEBATES ON TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY

Extraordinary-scale measures were implemented to ensure election security. Steps such as restrictions on mobile banking transactions in the pre-election period, regulations requiring the surrender of licensed firearms, and limitations on motorcycle use showed that the elections were conducted in a high-security environment. On election day, a large number of security personnel were deployed; practices aimed at increasing transparency—such as camera monitoring at a significant portion of polling stations—were used.

Nevertheless, criticisms emerged in some areas regarding the speed at which results and records were announced. In addition, allegations of interference with poll workers, as well as localized incidents of violence and harassment and debates over vote cancellations, featured in political rhetoric after election day.

Some actors stated that they would pursue recount and objection procedures for certain regions. While this picture was read, on the one hand, as a justification that legitimized a “high security and control” approach, on the other hand it pointed to the need to strengthen institutions’ long-term capacity in terms of “freedom of competition” and “societal acceptance of confidence in the ballot.”

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The February 2026 election marked a critical threshold in completing the post-revolution transition period through the ballot box. The referendum held on the same day showed that the reform agenda was not merely campaign rhetoric, but was carried to the level of institutional design. In this framework, three determining issues came to the fore for the period ahead: (i) the implementation timetable of the reform package and its capacity to produce tangible results, (ii) the normalization of the competitive environment and the management of representation debates, and (iii) making election security sustainable through institutional capacity and standard procedures rather than extraordinary measures.

Steps taken on these issues will determine the potential to transform the 2026 election from a “one-off transition election” into a lasting institutional framework for the new period.

Sources:

• Özdoğan, A. (2026). Bangladesh February 2026 Elections: Analytical Report. Enhar – Enderun Law Movement (ENHAR). Publication date: 17 February 2026.
• https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/main-issues-bangladeshs-february-12-election-2026-02-10/?utm
• https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/bangladesh/ohchr-fftb-hr-violations-bd.pdf?utm
• https://data.ipu.org/parliament/BD/BD-LC01/?utm
• https://www.idea.int/news/overcoming-bangladeshs-electoral-integrity-deficit-time-political-compromise-and-dialogue?utm

POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN BANGLADESH

Bangladesh has a political system that is predominantly parliamentary. The political center of gravity of the executive branch is the Prime Minister’s Office; on the constitutional/representative plane, it is the Presidency.

• Head of State (President): The President is not elected by popular vote; instead, they are elected indirectly through the National Parliament (Jatiyo Shangsad). The term of office is 5 years and may be extended once.
• Government and Executive (Prime Minister): The Prime Minister is generally the leader of the political movement that wins a majority in parliament and is appointed by the President. The Prime Minister is the principal executive actor in the country’s day-to-day administration and in policy-making processes.
• Legislature (Jatiyo Shangsad – National Parliament): The legislative body is called the Jatiyo Shangsad and consists of 350 seats in total:
  • 300 seats: Determined by direct election from constituencies.
  • 50 seats (women’s quota): Elected indirectly through parliamentarians and serves as a mechanism to strengthen representation reserved for women.
• Term of office: The term of office for members of parliament is 5 years.

Note: In this framework, because election results directly determine the composition of the legislature, the formation of the government and the direction of the executive are shaped largely by the parliamentary majority.

Prepared by: Ahmet Deveci

According to the results, for the first time a single party won a majority large enough to amend the Constitution on its own. The LDP—generally Japan’s leading party over the past 70 years—delivered the most successful election in its history at a time when it had been losing public trust due to scandals. Increasing its number of seats by 125 compared to the previous term and reaching 316, the LDP’s pre-election coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), became the third-largest party with 36 seats. Thus, the governing bloc reached an overwhelming majority of 352 seats, while 8 opposition parties shared the remaining 113 seats.

The Process That Led Japan to a Snap Election

The background to the snap general election in Japan is rooted in a deep legitimacy crisis within the ruling LDP. The slush-fund scandal that surfaced in 2023 and implicated many senior figures in the party caused an unprecedented erosion of trust in Japanese politics. The revelation that more than 80 LDP lawmakers improperly reported political donation income between 2018 and 2022 led to the resignation of four cabinet members; in the subsequent 2024 House of Representatives and 2025 House of Councillors elections, a significant share of candidates involved in the scandal suffered heavy defeats at the ballot box. While opinion polls showed that more than 80% of voters directly attributed the LDP’s losses to this scandal, a sharp decline in donation revenues also increased internal and external pressure on the party. These developments triggered the process that led to then–Prime Minister Kishida Fumio’s resignation on 1 October 2024.

Amid this deepening political crisis, Kishida’s successor Shigeru Ishiba resigned on 21 October 2025. With Ishiba’s resignation on 7 September, the LDP leadership was effectively left vacant; in the party leadership election held on 5 October, Sanae Takaichi was elected as the LDP’s first female party leader. Assuming the premiership on 21 October, Takaichi became the first female prime minister in Japanese history.

However, this leadership change also brought to the surface structural tensions that had been accumulating within the governing coalition for a long time. Indeed, on 10 October, Komeito leader Tetsuo Saito decided to withdraw his party from the coalition it had maintained with the LDP for 26 years, effectively ending the existing government architecture.

Following this development, Takaichi formed a new coalition with the JIP to restore political stability and established her government on 21 October. Meanwhile, a new political alignment emerged between the former coalition partner Komeito and the main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), under the name “Centrist Reform Alliance.” However, despite entering the election with strong ambitions, this alliance failed to deliver a performance that met public expectations.

The new government under Takaichi quickly realized that the LDP’s legitimacy problem in the public eye could not be overcome through a leadership change alone. In this context, despite her party’s difficult period, Prime Minister Takaichi adopted a “confidence renewal” strategy by taking political risks: she announced the decision to hold a snap election on 19 January and dissolved the House of Representatives on 23 January. This decision was interpreted as a concrete sign both of the search for a fresh start within the LDP and of an effort to rebuild eroded public trust through a democratic test. By contrast, the main opposition and the former coalition partner’s decision to contest the election together turned the snap election into not only a vote of confidence, but also a critical turning point in which new alliance-seeking within Japan’s political system was tested.

Takaichi’s Japan

After Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi came to power, the economic and political direction pursued has been based on a policy package that addresses sustainable fiscal discipline and strategic investment priorities together. While emphasizing sustainability in public finances, the Takaichi administration also defines as a core priority the uninterrupted financing of necessary investments in areas such as defense, infrastructure, and technology. In Japan—experiencing inflation for the first time in many years—financial markets will closely monitor how the balance will be managed between investment-led goals and the fight against inflation.

The unlimited parliamentary power secured under Takaichi’s leadership will also strengthen the government’s hand on defense spending—an issue that holds a top priority among Takaichi’s campaign promises and lies at the center of ongoing debates.

In foreign policy, the Takaichi government is expected to follow a line that prioritizes Japan’s influence in Asia and defines regional competition more explicitly. In this framework, it appears the country is entering a period in which strategic competition with China will intensify, while Japan–U.S. relations will further strengthen. Takaichi’s reportedly good relations with Donald Trump increase the likelihood of closer cooperation with Washington in security and defense. Accordingly, Japan’s foreign policy is gaining a more ambitious and geopolitically proactive orientation, aligned with rising defense spending and regional power projection.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN JAPAN

Form of Government: Constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy under the 1947 Constitution

Head of State (Symbolic): Emperor — constitutionally, the Emperor is solely the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, and has no executive or legislative authority.

Executive: Exercised by the Prime Minister—designated by the party or coalition holding the majority in parliament—and the Cabinet under the Prime Minister’s leadership. The Prime Minister is elected by the legislature, and the cabinet is politically accountable to parliament.

Legislature: Japan’s National Diet (Kokkai) is bicameral.

• House of Representatives (Shūgi-in) is one of the two chambers and is among the highest organs of the state. Core powers—such as the budget, legislation, and the selection of the prime minister—are concentrated in the House of Representatives. Members are elected for 4 years. It has 465 members.
• House of Councillors (Sangi-in) has 248 members, who serve 6-year terms. Half of the members are renewed every 3 years. It cannot be dissolved.

Judiciary: Judicial power is vested in independent courts with the authority of constitutional review.

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Bibliography:

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/8/pm-sanae-takaichis-party-set-for-majority-in-japan-parliamentary-elections

https://asia.nikkei.com/politics/japan-election

https://www.csis.org/analysis/japans-26-year-old-ruling-coalition-collapses

https://globalaffairs.org/commentary/analysis/what-takaichis-win-means-japans-foreign-policy-priorities

https://www.cfr.org/articles/political-realignment-and-the-2026-japanese-election-ii

https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d01210/

Date prepared: 25.02.2025

Sadık Harun Köksal