The elections held in the United Kingdom on 7 May 2026 produced a notable picture in light of the country’s multi-layered, yet non-federal, constitutional structure. Within the same electoral calendar, local government elections were held in England, while Scotland elected the Scottish Parliament and Wales elected the new term of the Welsh Parliament.

Although the local government results in England do not, as a matter of law, bring down the central government, the elections are legally significant in that they make visible the relationship of competences between the United Kingdom Parliament and the devolved legislatures. The elections in Scotland and Wales do not, in themselves, alter the constitutional status of those nations within the United Kingdom. They do, however, determine the representative composition of the legislatures for the new parliamentary term, the processes of government formation, and the political basis on which future debates over powers with the central Parliament will be conducted.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom is a state operating on the basis of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy, but it is not federal in the classical sense. Its constitutional order is not based on a single codified constitutional text; rather, it rests on Acts of Parliament, constitutional conventions, judicial decisions, and fundamental constitutional principles.

Although King Charles is the Head of State, executive power is exercised by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, whose authority rests on the majority in the House of Commons. The Parliament of the United Kingdom, commonly referred to as the Westminster Parliament, is the central legislature composed of the House of Commons and the House of Lords. In this text, the term “Westminster” is used to denote the United Kingdom Parliament in London and the central legislative authority.

The legislative and executive powers held by Scotland and Wales are devolved powers conferred by legislation enacted by Westminster. For this reason, Scotland and Wales do not have the same constitutional status as, for example, the Länder in the German federal system. Under the United Kingdom’s system of devolution, Scotland and Wales are able to take decisions in certain fields through their own parliaments without being fully independent states.

Under this system, the matters that remain under the control of the United Kingdom Parliament in London are predetermined; fields such as foreign policy, defence, immigration, citizenship, and monetary policy remain with the central government. In areas outside those reserved matters, such as health, education, the environment, local government, and housing, Scotland and Wales may enact their own legislation. Thus, while the United Kingdom remains a single state, extensive powers are granted to regional governments in certain areas of domestic policy.

ELECTION RESULTS AND TURNOUT RATES

OUTCOME OF THE LOCAL ELECTIONS IN ENGLAND

On 7 May 2026, local elections were held in 136 local authorities in England. These elections are not United Kingdom general elections; accordingly, they do not produce a legal effect that directly alters the Prime Minister’s office or the government majority in the House of Commons. Local elections determine the composition of municipal councils and local government bodies.

The results pointed to substantial local losses for the Labour Party, the party of the central government. Labour was recorded as having lost 1,406 of the 2,403 seats it had held, while Reform UK, which had previously held a total of 2 seats in the relevant local authorities, won 1,444 seats and finished ahead.

Reform UK is a political party positioned on the right of the United Kingdom’s political spectrum and is strongly associated with an anti-immigration platform. The party emerged as the successor to the Brexit Party, which was initially established to support the Brexit process. In London, 9 of the 19 boroughs held by Labour changed hands.

Following the local elections, public and intra-party calls for Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s resignation came onto the agenda. It was reported that the number of Labour MPs calling for his resignation had reached 89 and that three ministers of state had left their posts. Starmer stated that he accepted responsibility for the election results, but would not resign.

The legal character of these developments lies in the sphere of intra-party leadership and political accountability rather than in the constitutional existence of the government. The continuation of the government in Westminster depends not on local election results, but on the parliamentary majority in the House of Commons and the internal leadership mechanisms of the party.

THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT: AN ELECTORAL MANDATE DOES NOT BY ITSELF CONFER LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR INDEPENDENCE

In Scotland, an election was held on 7 May 2026 for the 129-member Scottish Parliament. The Parliament consists of 73 constituency members and 56 regional list members. The majority threshold is 65 seats. Voter turnout was approximately 53.2%.

The Scottish National Party (SNP) became the largest party with 58 seats, but did not reach the number of seats required for an outright majority. Labour and Reform UK each won 17 seats and shared second place; the Scottish Greens obtained 15 seats, the Conservative Party 12, and the Liberal Democrats 10. This distribution indicates that government formation in Scotland will depend on support arrangements within the Parliament.

Scotland’s legal position within the United Kingdom is based on the devolution settlement established by the Scotland Act 1998 and subsequent amendments. Because Scotland has historically maintained a distinct legal tradition, it possesses a stronger institutional and legal distinctiveness than Wales. Nevertheless, fundamental matters relating to the Union, the United Kingdom Parliament, and constitutional status remain within Westminster’s reserved competence.

The SNP’s position as the largest party demonstrates that the pro-independence line in Scotland continues to be represented in Parliament. However, the election result does not, as a matter of law, create authority to hold a new independence referendum. In its 2022 decision, the UK Supreme Court held that the Scottish Parliament does not have the power to legislate for an independence referendum without Westminster’s consent.

THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS IN THE WELSH PARLIAMENT HAS INCREASED

In Wales, the election for the new term of the Welsh Parliament, officially known as Senedd Cymru, was held on 7 May 2026. “Senedd Cymru” means the Welsh Parliament in Welsh.

The 2026 election was the first election in Wales held under the new electoral system. The number of Senedd members was increased to 96, with 6 members elected from each of the 16 constituencies. Voter turnout was approximately 51.6%.

Plaid Cymru became the largest party with 43 seats, while Reform UK came second with 34 seats. Labour won 9 seats, the Conservative Party 7, the Greens 2, and the Liberal Democrats 1. Plaid Cymru is a party that advocates Welsh nationalism, is positioned on a centre-left/social democratic line, supports strengthening Wales’s autonomy within the United Kingdom, and favours keeping the option of independence on the long-term agenda.

Devolution in Wales is based on the legal framework developed through the Government of Wales Act 2006 and the Wales Act 2017. The Welsh legislative regime, which was initially more limited and administrative in character, has gradually evolved into a model with broader legislative competence.

At the same time, Wales’s powers are also devolved powers conferred by Westminster. The constitutional structure of the Union, foreign policy, defence, citizenship, immigration, and central constitutional institutions do not fall within the competence of the Welsh Parliament.

Plaid Cymru’s emergence as the largest party represents a partial departure in Welsh politics from the London-centred two-party order. The party is particularly associated with strengthening the Welsh language and cultural identity, increasing local priorities in public services, and demanding further devolution from Westminster. Accordingly, in the new parliamentary term, a more distinctly Wales-centred policy line may be expected to gain strength in devolved areas such as education, health, housing policy, local government, and the public use of the Welsh language. However, the Welsh Parliament cannot decide alone on matters such as constitutional status, independence, or withdrawal from the United Kingdom; such matters remain within Westminster’s competence.

Bibliography

• TRT Haber, “Starmer told his cabinet he would not resign: 3 ministers resigned”, 12.05.2026.
• Anadolu Agency, news coverage concerning local and regional elections in the United Kingdom, 2026.
• House of Commons Library, “Scottish Parliament elections 2026”, 2026.
• SPICe / Scottish Parliament Information Centre, “The results are in – general election 2026”, 2026.
• House of Commons Library, “Senedd Cymru / Welsh Parliament elections 2026”, 2026.
• Electoral Reform Society, “How Wales voted in the 2026 Senedd election”, 2026.
• Reuters, “English voters where Labour lost say PM Starmer has to go”, 2026.
• Associated Press, “What to know about British elections that hammered Starmer’s Labour Party”, 2026.
• Al Jazeera, news coverage concerning the United Kingdom elections and Keir Starmer’s leadership, 2026.
• UK Supreme Court, “Reference by the Lord Advocate of devolution issues under the Scotland Act 1998”, 2022.
• House of Commons Library, “What is devolution?” and “Reserved matters in the United Kingdom”, 2025-2026.

Date prepared: 14.05.2026
Ahmet Deveci

Bulgaria Elections 2026

Bulgaria’s Eighth Parliamentary Election in Five Years: Hope for Stable Government at the Ballot Box

23.04.2026

The early parliamentary election held on 19 April 2026 was conducted with the stated prospect of breaking the cycle of fragmented parliaments and short-lived governments that has persisted in Bulgaria since 2021. According to the final figures of the Central Election Commission, voter turnout rose to %51.11. This was significantly above the %38.83 turnout recorded in October 2024 and indicates a break from the low-turnout trend of recent years. The increase in participation is noteworthy in that the election fatigue generated by the eighth election in five years appears, this time, to have translated into a search for stable government.

As of 12:00 on 20 April 2026, preliminary results of the Central Election Commission (CEC), based on 97.52% of processed protocols, showed the centre-left Progressive Bulgaria Coalition clearly in first place with 44.7%, Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) in second place with 13.4%, the centrist/liberal reformist We Continue the Change-Democratic Bulgaria (PP-DB) Alliance in third place with 12.8%, the minority-representation-oriented centre-line Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF/HÖH) in fourth place with 6.8%, and the far-right nationalist Vazrazhdane (Revival) in fifth place with 4.3%.

Main results

Unlike previous elections, this result points not to the classic pattern of diffuse fragmentation, but to a strong concentration in favour of the leading political bloc. The Progressive Bulgaria Coalition received %44.594 of the vote, yet secured 131 of 240 seats, that is, an absolute majority in parliament. This is explained by the fact that, in Bulgaria, only parties and coalitions that pass the 4% national electoral threshold participate in the allocation of seats, while votes cast for parties below the threshold are excluded from that distribution. According to CEC/CIK data, the 4% threshold corresponded to 129,606 votes; the total number of valid votes included in the seat allocation was therefore lower than the total number of valid party votes. For this reason, 44.6% of the vote effectively turned into a parliamentary majority in the seat calculation.

The significance of this election lies not only in identifying the leading party, but also in the fact that the constitutional government-formation process appears, this time, to have moved closer to producing a workable outcome.

The reason why Rumen Radev, who first assumed the office of President of Bulgaria in 2017, became the dominant actor in these elections is that, under Bulgarian law, executive authority is concentrated not in the presidency, but in the prime minister and the council of ministers based on parliamentary confidence. In January 2026, Radev left the largely representative office of the presidency and entered a parliamentary contest aimed at acquiring

actual executive power. Accordingly, the issue here is not the continuation of a head of state’s mandate, but rather a move within the parliamentary system towards leadership of the government.

The decisive factor for how the government will take shape is the operation of the constitutionally prescribed chain of mandates following the final allocation of seats. The first mandate is given to the largest parliamentary group; if that group is unable to form a government, the mandate proceeds to the second and then the third largest groups.

The current picture represents the scenario closest either to a single-party majority capable of preventing another early election, or to a government that could function with limited external support.

The fact that Bulgaria has gone to the polls eight times in the last five years demonstrates that the capacity of coalitions to produce effective government has become blocked. In the parliaments formed since 2021, enduring cabinet architecture could not be established due to party polarization, sharp divisions over judicial reform, short-lived coalitions, and repeated crises of confidence. After protests over budget policy and the justice system intensified in December 2025, the government’s resignation resulted in President Iliana Yotova appointing a caretaker government headed by Andrey Gyurov. This cycle places direct pressure on budget discipline, the use of EU funds, judicial reform, and the predictability of public administration.

For Bulgaria’s Turks, the election results are also important from the perspective of the practical visibility of the constitutional right to vote and the right to political representation. The fact that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF/HÖH), which traditionally functions as a channel of representation for a significant share of the Turkish minority and other Muslim communities, passed the electoral threshold shows that these voter groups continue to have the possibility of representation in parliament with 21 deputies. The preservation of 27 polling stations established in Türkiye also demonstrates, at an institutional level, the continued access of Bulgarian citizens living abroad to the right to vote and to cross-border democratic participation.

Key notes on the functioning of democracy in Bulgaria

• Constitutional Order: Bulgaria is a unicameral parliamentary republic operating under the 1991 Constitution and based on the principle of separation of powers.
• Legislature: Legislative authority is exercised by the 240-member National Assembly, elected for a four-year term. The National Assembly enacts laws, elects the government, and oversees the executive through instruments of parliamentary scrutiny.
• Electoral System: Members of parliament are elected under an open-list proportional representation system applied in 31 multi-member constituencies; a nationwide electoral threshold of 4% applies to parties and coalitions.
• Executive: Executive authority is exercised by the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister. The government depends on the confidence of parliament, and the political legitimacy of the executive is therefore directly linked to the parliamentary majority.
• President: The President is elected directly by the people for a five-year term. Within the parliamentary system, the President does not assume day-to-day political responsibility for the executive; however, the office has important constitutional functions in assigning the mandate to form a government, appointing a caretaker government when the constitutional process fails, dissolving the National Assembly, and setting the date of new elections.
• Government-Formation Mechanism: When a stable majority does not emerge in parliament, the President assigns the mandate to form a government to parliamentary groups in the constitutional order. If this process remains inconclusive, the appointment of a caretaker government and the holding of an early election become possible. This structure turns Bulgaria’s problem of political stability directly into a question of constitutional functioning.

Date prepared: 25.04.2026

Ahmet Deveci

Bibliography

• Central Election Commission of Bulgaria (CEC) – official website: https://www.cik.bg/en/
• Central Election Commission of Bulgaria, Election Code: https://www.cik.bg/upload/272337/2.1%2BELECTION_CODE.pdf
• BTA, election backgrounder: https://www.bta.bg/en/news/bulgaria/1108251-bulgaria-s-april-19-2026-early-parliamentary-elections-backgrounder
• BTA, elections special page: https://www.bta.bg/en/Parliamentary-elections-2026?tag=523
• BTA, assessment by international observers: https://www.bta.bg/en/Parliamentary-elections-2026?tag=523
• Anadolu Agency, 17.04.2026: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/uzmanlara-gore-son-5-yilda-8inci-kez-secime-giden-bulgaristanda-siyasi-denge-yeniden-sekilleniyor/3908962
• Reuters, 20.04.2026: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/bulgarias-former-president-radev-wins-parliamentary-election-official-partial-2026-04-20/
• Anadolu Agency, 20.04.2026: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/progressive-bulgaria-leads-exit-poll-with-392-/3911532

Hungary Elections 2026

Will the End of the Orbán Era Restore Unanimity in the European Union?

I. New Balances in Hungary

In the parliamentary elections held in Hungary on 12 April 2026, the Tisza Party led by Péter Magyar won 138 seats in the 199-member National Assembly, thereby securing the two-thirds majority required to amend the Constitution. As a result, Fidesz, led by Viktor Orbán and in power since 2010, lost its parliamentary majority for the first time.

According to the election results, while the Tisza Party achieved a constitutional majority on its own, Fidesz remained at 55 seats. This outcome points not only to a change of government, but also to a new period capable of producing constitutional and institutional consequences in terms of the scope of the legislative majority. In this respect, the election is significant not merely because executive power changed hands in Hungary, but also because it reshaped the country’s constitutional capacity for legal action and the parliamentary balance.

Under Hungarian constitutional law, a two-thirds majority provides a broader legal capacity for action than ordinary legislative activity. This majority is of particular importance for amending laws, adopting or modifying regulations in certain constitutionally protected areas that require a special majority, and exercising influence in specific constitutional or institutional appointment processes. For this reason, the election result should be assessed not only as a change in the executive, but also in terms of the impact of the legislative majority on the constitutional order. Although the Tisza Party, like the previous ruling party, is situated within a centre-right political line, it has, unlike its predecessor, adopted a reform-oriented approach emphasising the strengthening of institutional relations with the European Union. This, in turn, indicates that certain constitutional and legislative alignment measures may come onto the agenda in the new period.

II. European Union Law and Institutional Alignment

The significance of the election results from the perspective of European Union law arises particularly within the framework of decision-making procedures and institutional alignment mechanisms within the Union. Within the European Union, decisions in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy are, as a rule, subject to the principle of unanimity. This structure allows each member state to exercise individual influence in certain areas of decision-making. In the past, Hungary was the state that most frequently blocked EU decisions, with 21 vetoes. For this reason, Hungary’s approach to these mechanisms in the new period is of institutional importance for the functioning of internal EU decision-making processes. In particular, the special procedures laid down in the treaties concerning foreign policy and sanctions regimes render the positions of member states not merely political, but also legally consequential.

From the perspective of financial law, the process should be examined within the framework of conditionality mechanisms aimed at protecting the European Union budget. Hungary’s access to European Union funds is linked to the fulfilment of specific reform measures, institutional standards, and the expectations of the European Commission. According to the official statements of the European Commission concerning Hungary, the country’s recovery and resilience plan includes numerous reform and investment components, and the implementation of this plan is contingent upon the fulfilment of certain milestones and targets. In this context, the broad legislative capacity held by the new parliament provides a technical possibility for carrying out the legal and institutional arrangements deemed necessary by other EU member states.

III. Hungary’s Political Structure

Form of Government: Unicameral parliamentary republic.
Head of State: The President of the Republic is an office representing the unity of the state and primarily performs ceremonial functions. The office does not play a decisive political role in the day-to-day functioning of the executive.
Executive: Executive power is exercised by the government and the prime minister formed by the political force holding the parliamentary majority. The prime minister is the effective centre of executive authority within the political system, and the government is accountable to parliament.
Legislature: Legislative power is exercised by the unicameral National Assembly (Országgyűlés). The Assembly consists of 199 members elected for a four-year term.
Electoral System: Hungary applies a mixed electoral system. 106 members of parliament are elected from single-member constituencies, while 93 are elected from national party lists. A two-thirds majority in parliament is of particular importance for constitutional amendments and certain constitutional and institutional arrangements.
Administrative Structure: The country displays a centralised administrative structure. This increases the influence of the central government over local administrations, budget allocation, and public governance.
Judiciary: Judicial authority is exercised by independent courts. Constitutional review is carried out by the Constitutional Court.

Prepared by: Ahmet Deveci

Bibliography:

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/12/hungary-election-early-results-show-magyars-tisza-ahead-of-orbans-fidesz

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/13/who-is-peter-magyar-hungarys-new-leader-who-trounced-viktor-orban

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/magyar-wins-general-elections-in-hungary-against-incumbent-orban/3903176

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/how-does-the-council-vote/unanimity/

https://reforms-investments.ec.europa.eu/hungarys-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/once-inspired-by-orban-hungarys-peter-magyar-unseats-him-landmark-election-2026-04-12/

Elections Held – Political System Summary – Assessment

This bulletin summarizes, in chronological order, the national and notable sub-national elections held in March 2026 as of 31 March 2026.

House of Representatives Election | 5 March 2026

Assessment

The House of Representatives election held in Nepal on 5 March 2026 constituted a noteworthy example in terms of the political participation of young voters and the renewal of parliamentary representation. The number of registered voters was announced as 18,903,689. In the proportional representation vote, 11,280,617 voters cast ballots; turnout stood at 59.67%. Of these votes, 10,835,025 were recorded as valid and 445,592 as invalid/blank. As a result of the election, the centrist-reformist Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), led by Balendra Shah, won 182 seats in the 275-seat House of Representatives, securing a majority sufficient to form a government alone. The centre-left Nepali Congress ranked second with 38 seats, while other parties remained at a more limited level of representation. This majority obtained by the RSP is significant because it marks the first time since 1999 that a party in Nepal has reached a parliamentary arithmetic capable of forming a government without the need for a coalition.

Nepal adopted a parliamentary system based on the principles of a federal democratic republic under the 2015 Constitution. The Federal Parliament is bicameral: the House of Representatives and the National Assembly. The House of Representatives consists of 275 members; 165 members are elected under a single-member constituency majority system, while 110 members are elected through a nationwide proportional representation system. The House of Representatives occupies a central position in the formation of the government, the conduct of legislative activities, the budgetary process and parliamentary oversight of the executive. For this reason, the 2026 elections should be assessed not only in terms of party balances, but also in terms of the executive’s parliamentary base and legislative capacity.

Balendra Shah’s attainment of a national-level majority as a former rap artist and an actor coming from local government is one of the distinguishing features of the election. In the election held after the 2025 protests, in which the younger generation of voters played a particularly visible role, the RSP’s achievement of a majority shows that the influence of young voters was reflected in parliamentary representation through the constitutional electoral mechanism.

In terms of election observation, ANFREL’s findings (Asian Network for Free Elections) indicate that the process was generally peaceful and orderly; however, shortcomings were identified in areas such as observer access and accessibility for voters with disabilities. While these findings do not eliminate the general legitimacy of the elections, they indicate the need to strengthen election administration, polling-station access and election observation standards in Nepal.

In September 2025, the Gen Z protests in Nepal, which began in response to the social media ban and public administration, resulted in casualties following intervention by security forces. In the investigation conducted after the elections in connection with these events, Nepal’s former prime minister and leader of the Communist Party of Nepal, Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli, was taken into police custody on 28 March 2026. The allegations against Oli are framed around the failure to prevent the deaths during the protests and the possible negligence, oversight or command responsibility of the executive authority.

Legislative Election | 8 March 2026

Assessment

The legislative elections held in Colombia on 8 March 2026 showed that the fragmented structure of representation in Congress continued. Turnout was 50.62%; 20,900,614 of 41,287,084 registered voters cast ballots. The number of valid votes was recorded as 18,806,189, invalid votes as 573,572 and unmarked ballots as 495,519. The Colombian Congress is a bicameral legislature with a total of 284 seats, consisting of the 102-member Senate and the 182-member House of Representatives. In the Senate, Pacto Histórico ranked first with 25 seats, while the Democratic Center Party obtained 17, the Liberal Party 13, the Green Alliance 10, the Conservative Party 10, the Party of the U 9 and Radical Change 7 seats. In the House of Representatives, the Democratic Center Party won 32 seats, the Liberal Party 31 and Pacto Histórico 29. This distribution shows that no political bloc achieved a congressional majority on its own.

Colombia is a unitary presidential republic under the 1991 Constitution. The president is both head of state and head of the executive; legislative power is exercised by the bicameral Congress, consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives. In the presidential system, the executive does not depend on the confidence of Congress; however, sufficient legislative support in Congress is required for bills, the budget and the reform agenda.

In terms of party balances, Pacto Histórico is a centre-left bloc close to President Gustavo Petro’s line and stands out with social reforms, combating inequality, and regulations concerning health and labour. The Democratic Center Party is positioned on the centre-right and is defined by its approach to security policy, public order and a private-sector-oriented economy. While the Liberal Party is located on the centre-left and the Conservative Party on the centre-right, the Green Alliance stands out on environmental and democratic reform issues, whereas the Party of the U and Radical Change are characterized by more pragmatic lines.

These results indicate that legislative majorities in Colombia will be formed through issue-based cooperation rather than permanent blocs. With regard to social reforms, the health system, labour, security policies and constitutional debates, the executive’s room for manoeuvre will depend on its ability to build sustainable majorities in Congress.

The legislative elections held in Colombia on 8 March 2026 did not change the government. Under the presidential system, the executive is formed by the president; ministers are appointed by the president, not by Congress. Therefore, the main result of the elections was not the formation of a government, but the emergence of the limits of the current executive’s legislative support in Congress.

Presidential Election | 15 March 2026

Assessment

The presidential election held in the Republic of the Congo on 15 March 2026 was a process in which continuity in the executive office was confirmed through the constitutional electoral procedure. According to the finalized results, incumbent President Denis Sassou Nguesso was re-elected with approximately 94.9% of the vote. His closest rival, Mavoungou Zinga Mabio, remained at approximately 1.4–1.5%, while the other candidates received limited vote shares. Turnout was announced in the official results at approximately 85%. The Constitutional Court finalized the election result on 28 March 2026.

Following the 2015 Constitution, the Republic of the Congo is governed by a presidential system with extensive executive powers. The president is both head of state and head of the executive. Although the office of prime minister was re-established by the 2015 constitutional arrangement, the political centre of gravity of the executive is the presidency. The legislature is bicameral, consisting of the National Assembly and the Senate. Within this structure, the presidential election is of central importance not only for determining the head of state, but also for the constitutional basis of executive power.

The president is elected directly by the people. The electoral system is based on a majority principle; in order to be elected, a candidate must receive an absolute majority of valid votes. If this threshold is not met in the first round, a second round is held. In the 2026 election, Denis Sassou Nguesso was elected in the first round with a very high vote share, and therefore no second round was held. The president’s term of office is five years. The removal of the previous age and term limits by the 2015 constitutional amendment provided the constitutional basis for Sassou Nguesso’s renewed candidacy.

Legislative Election | 15 March 2026

Assessment

Vietnam is a one-party state governed under a socialist republic model, with the Communist Party of Vietnam at the centre of the political sphere. On 15 March 2026, elections were held for the 16th National Assembly and for the local People’s Councils for the 2026–2031 term. Turnout stood at 99.70%; 76,198,214 of 76,423,940 registered voters cast ballots. The election date was brought forward by a decision shortening the current legislative term; the process came immediately after the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the re-election of Tô Lâm as party general secretary. For this reason, the election represented less a change of power than a confirmation of the cadres and priorities with which the party-state order would be carried into the new period. Although the National Assembly is constitutionally defined as the highest representative body of the people and the highest organ of state power, in the one-party structure strategic political direction and senior personnel preferences are essentially shaped within the party. In the 2026 election, 500 seats were contested across 182 constituencies; the candidate pool included 864 names. Only a limited portion of these consisted of candidates who were not party members. The Standing Committee of the National Assembly and the Vietnam Fatherland Front play a decisive role in the candidate nomination process; this shows that electoral competition functions less as a mechanism producing a multi-party alternation of power and more as an institutional mechanism managing intra-regime representation and cadre renewal.

The main actor in political competition was the Communist Party of Vietnam. Following the 14th Congress, the party identified high growth, administrative simplification, reduction of bureaucracy, digital transformation, science and technology investments, and infrastructure initiatives as the main axes of the new period. Tô Lâm’s line reflects, on the one hand, a developmental approach that accelerates economic decision-making processes and, on the other, a stricter administrative understanding that strengthens state capacity and central coordination. Therefore, the 2026 elections should be read not as ideological competition between parties in the classical sense, but as an instrument for generating social approval for the ruling party’s agenda of reform, discipline and development.

The official results showed that this dominance also continued in quantitative terms. All 500 seats were filled; the Communist Party of Vietnam maintained its decisive dominance over the Assembly with 482 seats. The turnout rate was announced as extremely high; it was emphasized that women’s representation and the proportion of full-time deputies increased in the new Assembly. At the local level, the elections were conducted within a large-scale administrative mobilization; however, the capacity of independent or self-nominated candidates to be elected remained limited. In terms of electoral procedure, institutional safeguards such as secret voting, counting at polling stations and supervision by the National Election Council are provided; certain representation ratios for women and ethnic minorities are also preserved in candidate lists. Nevertheless, because the candidate nomination process is subject to strict institutional filters and the overwhelming majority of the candidate pool consists of party members, the debate on electoral credibility in the Vietnamese case is shaped not around free multi-party competition, but around the extent to which intra-system representation is managed in an inclusive and controlled manner.

Municipal Elections | 15 March 2026 / 22 March 2026

Assessment

Municipal elections were held in France on 15 and 22 March 2026. Through these elections, municipal councils across the country were renewed and the local representative structure necessary for determining mayors was formed. In France, the mayor is not elected directly by the people; voters elect the members of the municipal council, and the mayor is then chosen from among those council members. The term of office is six years. For Turkish readers, the French concept of commune can generally be understood as a “municipality/local administrative unit”; accordingly, there are approximately 35,000 municipal units in the country, including very small settlements.

France is a unitary state governed under a semi-presidential system. Although the president and the central administration hold a strong position, municipalities have significant powers in relation to local public services, urban management, zoning, transport, local infrastructure and social services. For this reason, municipal elections mean not only the selection of local administrators, but also the renewal of local democratic representation and of the decision-making bodies responsible for municipal services.

The electoral system varies according to the population of the municipality, but is essentially based on a two-round list system. In most municipalities, voters cast ballots not for individual candidates but for candidate lists. In order to provide the winning list with a governable majority in the municipal council, an additional seat advantage is granted. This system, known in French law as the prime majoritaire, may be rendered in English as a “majority bonus”. In simple terms, it facilitates the winning list’s attainment of a majority capable of electing the mayor and governing the municipality. The remaining seats are then distributed among the other lists according to their vote shares. Thus, the system seeks to ensure both governmental stability and the representation of different lists in the council.

The election results revealed differing political balances in major cities. In Paris, Socialist Emmanuel Grégoire won the municipal administration; in Marseille, Benoît Payan; and in Lyon, Green candidate Grégory Doucet. In these three large cities, candidates from the right and far-right lines were unable to take over municipal government. By contrast, in Nice the right/far-right line supported by Eric Ciotti succeeded; Édouard Philippe was re-elected in Le Havre, while centrist Thomas Cazenave stood out in Bordeaux. Turnout was approximately 57% in both rounds; a second round was held in approximately 1,500–1,600 municipalities where a definitive result was not obtained in the first round.

This picture shows that municipal elections in France do not produce a single national result. While left, ecologist and centrist candidates preserved strong positions in large metropolitan areas, alliances close to the right and far right achieved success at the level of local government in some cities. Therefore, the expression “resistance to the right/far right” can be used particularly in the sense that municipal government in major cities such as Paris, Marseille and Lyon did not pass to the right/far-right line. However, examples such as Nice show that this resistance is not absolute and homogeneous across the country.

State Parliament Election | 22 March 2026

In 2026, state elections in Germany are scheduled in Baden-Württemberg (8 March), Rhineland-Palatinate (22 March), Saxony-Anhalt (6 September), Berlin (20 September) and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (20 September).

Assessment

Germany is a federal state consisting of 16 Länder. Each Land elects its own parliament, and the Land government is formed according to this parliamentary arithmetic. Therefore, state elections are not limited to determining regional governments; they also have indirect effects on the balance of power in the Federal Council, the negotiating capacity of federal parties and political trends across the country. In this respect, the Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate elections are important both in terms of government formation at Land level and in terms of their repercussions for federal politics.

Baden-Württemberg: Turnout was 69.6%; approximately 5.41 million of around 7.77 million registered voters cast ballots. The number of valid votes relevant to party preference was recorded at approximately 5.37 million, while invalid votes amounted to approximately 32,000.

The fact that the Greens became the leading party in Baden-Württemberg can be explained by the candidate profile, the perception of continuity in Land government and the emphasis on economic stability. During the election process, the protection of industry, employment, administrative continuity and governing capacity in times of crisis came to the fore. Cem Özdemir’s candidacy created a more pragmatic and governance-oriented profile that appealed beyond the Greens’ traditional voter base. This result shows that voter behaviour at Land level can be shaped not only by party identity, but also by the candidate’s executive capacity and reliability.

In Rhineland-Palatinate, turnout was 68.5%; approximately 2.05 million of around 2.99 million registered voters cast ballots. There were 18,312 invalid party votes in Rhineland-Palatinate. This corresponds to 0.9% of the votes cast. The CDU’s lead in Rhineland-Palatinate is connected to the fatigue of the long-governing social-democratic line and the electorate’s demand for a change in government. This result changed the arithmetic for forming a government in the Land; for the SPD, it also revealed a picture in which its representative strength weakened at regional level. The SPD’s decline in different forms in both Länder has increased debates regarding the party’s capacity to preserve its traditional voter base and respond to new social demands. This is also important for coalition negotiations at the federal level and for the search for direction within the party.

The AfD’s rise to third-party status in both Länder is one of the most notable results of the elections. This rise shows that economic insecurity, debates on migration and internal security, and dissatisfaction with the existing party system are reflected in electoral behaviour. The increase in the AfD’s vote share particularly in western German Länder demonstrates that the party cannot be regarded as a political actor limited only to the eastern Länder. Nevertheless, the fact that the AfD remained in opposition shows that coalition options among the centrist parties continue to be decisive in the government formation process.

When the two elections are assessed together, a twofold tendency can be observed in voter behaviour. On the one hand, governing capacity, economic security and the search for stability are decisive; on the other hand, dissatisfaction with centrist parties expands the AfD’s space for representation. Therefore, the Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate elections show that, alongside government formation at Land level, competition within Germany’s federal party system is also moving toward a more fragmented and negotiation-based structure.

From the perspective of the Turkish diaspora, the Baden-Württemberg result is also noteworthy. Cem Özdemir’s attainment of a strong position at the level of Land premier as a politician of Turkish origin shows that actors with a migration background have opportunities for high-level representation within Germany’s political system. However, this does not mean that all historical, religious or political expectations of Turkish or Muslim communities are directly represented. Democratic representation must be evaluated not only by ethnic or cultural origin, but also by the policies defended, institutional priorities and political programme. The rise of the AfD indicates that issues of migration, belonging and social pluralism will continue to retain their importance in German politics.

Local Elections in 10 Municipalities | 29 March 2026

Assessment

On 29 March 2026, municipal council elections were held in the Serbian local units of Bor, Aranđelovac, Bajina Bašta, Kladovo, Knjaževac, Kula, Lučani, Majdanpek, Smederevska Palanka and Sevojno. A total of 50 lists competed in the elections, in which approximately 248,000 voters were eligible to vote. A total of 169,414 people cast ballots; the number of valid votes was recorded at approximately 165,864, while invalid votes amounted to 3,550. The share of invalid votes among votes cast was approximately 2.1%. According to the initial results, the ruling coalition led by the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) ranked first in all ten local units where elections were held. However, the fact that results were shaped by narrow margins in some municipalities showed that competition at the local level had increased.

Serbia is a unitary state based on a parliamentary republic model. The president is elected directly by the people; the government consists of the prime minister and ministers and depends on the confidence of the National Assembly. Nevertheless, in Serbian politics the office of the president has a strong de facto political influence. For this reason, the presentation of ruling lists in local elections under the name of President Aleksandar Vučić is noteworthy in terms of the clarity of the boundaries between the constitutional representative office and party campaigning.

In local elections, municipal councils are determined on the basis of proportional representation. Voters cast ballots for candidate lists; lists may be submitted by political parties, coalitions or citizens’ groups. The arithmetic of the municipal council is decisive for the formation of the local executive and municipal administration.

The results differed across local units. While the SNS-led list achieved a clear advantage in some municipalities such as Kladovo and Majdanpek, closer results emerged in Bor, Aranđelovac, Kula and Sevojno. In Bor, the ruling list won 19 seats, while the “Bor, naša odgovornost!” list won 15 seats. In Kula, a youth/student-supported list emerged as a strong second actor; in Sevojno, the balance of representation between the ruling list and the “Ujedinjeni-Sevojno” list was quite close.

Opposition and alternative lists did not gather under a single umbrella; instead, they appeared in different municipalities in the form of student movements, citizens’ groups and local alliances. “Bor, naša odgovornost!” in Bor, “Ujedinjeni za Bajinu Baštu” in Bajina Bašta, “Zvuk pravde – Zajedno za studente” in Lučani and the united opposition and youth lists in Smederevska Palanka are the main examples of this diversity.

From a legal and institutional assessment perspective, the elections were an ordinary electoral process aimed at renewing local councils. However, in its legal opinion dated 6 March 2026, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) indicated the need to strengthen confidence-building mechanisms in electoral legislation and to conduct the reform process in a more inclusive manner. Within this framework, the elections may be assessed as a process in which the ruling coalition preserved its first-place position at the local level, while opposition and local lists increased their representative strength in some municipalities.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Nepal

1. Election Commission Nepal. “Election Result – House of Representatives 2026.” https://election.gov.np/en/page/result-hor
2. ANFREL. “Nepal’s 2026 House of Representatives Elections Conducted Peacefully and Orderly; Accessibility and Observer Access Concerns Identified.” https://anfrel.org/nepals-2026-house-of-representatives-elections-conducted-peacefully-and-orderly-due-to-visible-security-deployment-accessibility-and-observer-access-concerns-identified/
3. ANFREL. “Pre-Election Assessment Mission Report: 2026 House of Representatives Elections in Nepal.” https://anfrel.org/pre-election-assessment-mission-report-2026-house-of-representatives-elections-in-nepal/
4. UNDP. “This time I voted for the new.” https://www.undp.org/stories/time-i-voted-new
5. IFES. “Elections in Nepal: 2026 General Elections.” https://www.ifes.org/tools-resources/election-snapshots/elections-nepal-2026-general-elections
6. Al Jazeera. “Rapper-turned-politician Balen Shah’s RSP heads for poll landslide in Nepal.” https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/8/rapper-turned-politician-defeats-veteran-leader-in-nepal-election-upset
7. Al Jazeera. “Nepal’s ex-PM arrested over alleged role in protest crackdown.” https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/28/nepals-ex-pm-arrested-over-alleged-role-in-protest-crackdown

Colombia

1. Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. “Elecciones del Congreso de la República 2026.” https://resultados.registraduria.gov.co/
2. Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. “Elecciones al Congreso de la República 2026 – proceso oficial.” https://wapp.registraduria.gov.co/electoral/2026/congreso-de-la-republica/
3. Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. “En las elecciones de Congreso de 2026 la participación aumentó y los votos nulos disminuyeron.” https://www.registraduria.gov.co/En-las-elecciones-de-Congreso-de-2026-la-participacion-aumento-y-los-votos.html
4. Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) PARLINE. “Colombia – Senate: March 2026 Election.” https://data.ipu.org/parliament/CO/CO-UC01/election/CO-UC01-E20260308
5. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye. “Political Outlook of Colombia.” https://www.mfa.gov.tr/kolombiya-siyasi-gorunumu.tr.mfa

Republic of the Congo

1. African Union. “Presidential Election in the Republic of the Congo.” https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20260330/presidential-election-republic-congo
2. African Union Peace and Security Department. “Announcement of the arrival of the African Union Election Observation Mission to the 15 March 2026 Presidential Election in the Republic of Congo.” https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/announcement-of-the-arrival-of-the-african-union-election-observation-mission-to-the-15-march-2026-presidential-election-in-the-republic-of-congo
3. Anadolu Agency. “Republic of the Congo goes to the polls for the presidential election.” https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/kongo-cumhuriyeti-cumhurbaskani-secimi-icin-sandik-basinda/3865445
4. Reuters. “Congo Republic’s Sassou wins re-election with nearly 95% in tightly controlled vote.” https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-republic-president-sassou-nguesso-wins-re-election-state-tv-reports-2026-03-17/
5. Associated Press. “President Denis Sassou-N’Guesso wins fifth term with court confirmation.” https://apnews.com/article/congo-election-president-constitutional-court-nguesso-c432bcb46fab80bdc8852f29f6b8bc6e

Vietnam

1. Vietnam News. “Results of 16th National Assembly election announced.” https://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/1777839/results-of-16th-national-assembly-election-announced.html
2. Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) PARLINE. “Viet Nam – National Assembly: March 2026 Election.” https://data.ipu.org/parliament/VN/VN-LC01/election/VN-LC01-E20260315
3. Reuters. “Vietnam’s top leader To Lam expands power, new PM elected.” https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/vietnam-parliament-elects-party-leader-lam-new-state-president-2026-04-07/
4. Freedom House. “Vietnam: Country Profile.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/vietnam

France

1. Ministère de l’Intérieur. “Municipales 2026 – résultats officiels.” https://www.resultats-elections.interieur.gouv.fr/municipales2026/
2. Service-Public.fr. “Municipal elections 2026: the voting system is changing in many municipalities.” https://www.service-public.gouv.fr/particuliers/actualites/A18432?lang=en
3. Anadolu Agency. “Election results in France’s local elections reflected the fragmented picture in the political arena.” https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/fransada-yerel-secimlerde-sandik-sonuclari-siyaset-arenasindaki-parcali-tabloyu-yansitti/3876106
4. Anadolu Agency. “The first round of local elections will be held in France today.” https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/fransada-bugun-yerel-secimlerin-ilk-turu-duzenlenecek/3864178
5. Le Monde. “French municipal elections: Full results in every city, town and village.” https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2026/03/22/french-municipal-elections-full-results-in-every-city-town-and-village_6751707_7.html
6. Le Monde. “French municipal elections: The second-round results in key races.” https://www.lemonde.fr/en/les-decodeurs/article/2026/03/23/french-municipal-elections-the-second-round-results-in-key-races_6751709_8.html

Germany (Baden-Württemberg / Rhineland-Palatinate)

1. Land Baden-Württemberg / Landtag. “Preliminary official result of the 2026 state election.” https://www.baden-wuerttemberg.de/de/service/presse/pressemitteilung/pid/vorlaeufiges-amtliches-ergebnis-der-landtagswahl-2026
2. State Election Baden-Württemberg. “Results of the 2026 state election in Baden-Württemberg.” https://www.landtagswahl-bw.de/ergebnisse-2026
3. State Returning Officer Rhineland-Palatinate. “State election 2026: Preliminary result.” https://www.wahlen.rlp.de/nachrichten/nachichtendetailseite/landtagswahl-2026-vorlaeufiges-ergebnis
4. State Returning Officer Rhineland-Palatinate. “Final result of the 2026 state election is confirmed.” https://www.wahlen.rlp.de/nachrichten/nachichtendetailseite/endgueltiges-ergebnis-der-landtagswahl-2026-steht-fest
5. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. “State election in Baden-Wuerttemberg on 8 March 2026.” https://www.kas.de/en/election-and-social-research-monitor/detail/-/content/state-election-in-baden-wuerttemberg-on-8-march-2026
6. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. “Analysis of the state election in Rhineland-Palatinate on 22 March 2026.” https://www.kas.de/en/election-and-social-research-monitor/detail/-/content/analysis-of-the-state-election-in-rhineland-palatinate-on-22-march-2026
7. Reuters. “German Greens lead Chancellor Merz’s conservatives in state election.” https://www.reuters.com/world/german-greens-lead-chancellor-merzs-conservatives-state-election-2026-03-08/

Serbia

1. Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. “Congress to observe local elections in 10 municipalities of Serbia.” https://www.coe.int/en/web/congress/-/congress-to-observe-local-elections-in-10-municipalities-of-serbia
2. CRTA. “Report on the Long-Term Observation of the 2026 Local Elections.” https://crta.rs/en/report-on-the-long-term-observation-of-the-2026-local-elections/
3. European Western Balkans. “Narrow victory for ruling SNS amid numerous incidents and irregularities.” https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2026/03/30/narrow-victory-for-ruling-sns-amid-numerous-incidents-and-irregularities/
4. OSCE/ODIHR. “Urgent Opinion / Legal Opinion concerning Serbia’s electoral framework.” https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/662623
5. Associated Press. “International observers urge violence-free elections after clashes at Serbia vote.” https://apnews.com/article/7ade5ea34784d647c1a60684b4a6a196

1. Associated Press. “European Union official says reports of violence during Serbia vote unacceptable.” https://apnews.com/article/1ef781a3c0441b5e723c9ea3e1482621

In this context, the process accelerated as the elections were moved from April 2026 to February 2026 and the timetable was announced on 11 December 2025. The general election was held simultaneously with a constitutional referendum on 12 February 2026. The elections drew particular attention because they were conducted in the aftermath of a revolution in which social dynamics—especially those under the age of 30—were decisive.

Election Process: Turnout, Security Measures, and the Referendum

According to the Election Commission, turnout in the 12 February election and referendum was announced as 59.44%. With 127,711,793 registered voters, approximately 75.9 million cast ballots. Of the 59 registered parties, 50 participated along with independents; a total of 2,028 candidates competed for 299 parliamentary seats.

The interim administration took extensive measures to ensure election security and public order. Restrictions on mobile banking transactions before the vote, the surrender of licensed firearms, and a ban on motorcycles entering traffic were among the most notable steps. On election day, more than 100,000 soldiers and around 200,000 police officers were deployed; transparency was increased by using camera monitoring at a large share of polling stations.

In the referendum held simultaneously with the election, a package of reforms was put to a vote, including a bicameral legislature, increasing women’s representation, strengthening judicial independence, and limiting the prime minister to two terms. The package was adopted with 68.6% “Yes.”

POLITICAL COMPETITION AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE ELECTION

Bangladesh’s February 2026 elections took place in a climate where “normal politics” and the post-revolution agenda of accountability / transitional justice advanced simultaneously. For this reason, the campaign was shaped not only around economic promises or social policies, but also around rebuilding state capacity after 2024, the credibility of institutions, and the legitimacy of the political order.

The most contested issue of the elections was the exclusion of the Awami League (AL) from the electoral process. Historically playing a decisive role in Bangladesh’s separation from Pakistan and attainment of independence and defining itself as secular and social democratic, the Awami League in recent years lost a significant portion of its social legitimacy due to growing criticism of authoritarianism and its governing practice. This trajectory culminated when the pro-democracy mass movement of July 2024 became a “political rupture,” and the Awami League was removed from power. The interim administration announced that the party had been banned in May 2025 in a manner covering all its activities, stating that the decision was taken within the framework of national security assessments and investigations linked to the violent incidents during the 2024 period. This increased criticism regarding the equality of electoral competition and the representative quality of the contest; for some, it made the election resemble a race with “incomplete competition.” On the other hand, the interim administration defended the step as necessary to “protect the post-revolution order” and to “remove from politics structures implicated in violence.”

With the Awami League absent, political competition largely intensified among the BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and new/alliance actors such as the National Citizens Party (NCP), whose visibility increased after the revolution. A common theme in campaign rhetoric was the “Spirit of July”: reform, anti-corruption, transparency in public administration, and holding the previous period to account found resonance—at different tones—across nearly all actors. In this sense, the election turned into a contest to “set the institutional course of the new period.”

Another key factor that hardened political competition was the growing intersection of “prosecution and politics” in the post-revolution period. The strong public resonance of investigations and judicial proceedings concerning figures from the previous administration moved the campaign beyond classic party rivalry and intertwined it with debates on “transitional justice.” This also split the arguments of those assessing the election’s legitimacy: on one side stood the emphasis on “dismantling the old order,” and on the other, concerns about “representation and pluralism.”

RESULTS: A CHANGE OF POWER AFTER 20 YEARS

According to official statements, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) won 209 of the 300 seats, securing the right to form a government on its own. Jamaat-e-Islami won 68 seats, while the NCP won 6. This outcome was recorded as a turning point in which a long-standing pattern of governance in the country changed through the ballot box.

The political meaning of the results stood out on two levels. First, with the parliamentary majority changing hands, executive power shifted to a new political center. Second, because the referendum was held on the same day, the debate was not limited to the question of “who will govern,” but also brought to the forefront the question of “what kind of institutional architecture” should be built. For this reason, the 2026 election was seen not only as a change of power, but also as a test ground for the new period through the implementability of reforms.

DEBATES ON TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY

Extraordinary-scale measures were implemented to ensure election security. Steps such as restrictions on mobile banking transactions in the pre-election period, regulations requiring the surrender of licensed firearms, and limitations on motorcycle use showed that the elections were conducted in a high-security environment. On election day, a large number of security personnel were deployed; practices aimed at increasing transparency—such as camera monitoring at a significant portion of polling stations—were used.

Nevertheless, criticisms emerged in some areas regarding the speed at which results and records were announced. In addition, allegations of interference with poll workers, as well as localized incidents of violence and harassment and debates over vote cancellations, featured in political rhetoric after election day.

Some actors stated that they would pursue recount and objection procedures for certain regions. While this picture was read, on the one hand, as a justification that legitimized a “high security and control” approach, on the other hand it pointed to the need to strengthen institutions’ long-term capacity in terms of “freedom of competition” and “societal acceptance of confidence in the ballot.”

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The February 2026 election marked a critical threshold in completing the post-revolution transition period through the ballot box. The referendum held on the same day showed that the reform agenda was not merely campaign rhetoric, but was carried to the level of institutional design. In this framework, three determining issues came to the fore for the period ahead: (i) the implementation timetable of the reform package and its capacity to produce tangible results, (ii) the normalization of the competitive environment and the management of representation debates, and (iii) making election security sustainable through institutional capacity and standard procedures rather than extraordinary measures.

Steps taken on these issues will determine the potential to transform the 2026 election from a “one-off transition election” into a lasting institutional framework for the new period.

Sources:

• Özdoğan, A. (2026). Bangladesh February 2026 Elections: Analytical Report. Enhar – Enderun Law Movement (ENHAR). Publication date: 17 February 2026.
• https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/main-issues-bangladeshs-february-12-election-2026-02-10/?utm
• https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/bangladesh/ohchr-fftb-hr-violations-bd.pdf?utm
• https://data.ipu.org/parliament/BD/BD-LC01/?utm
• https://www.idea.int/news/overcoming-bangladeshs-electoral-integrity-deficit-time-political-compromise-and-dialogue?utm

POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN BANGLADESH

Bangladesh has a political system that is predominantly parliamentary. The political center of gravity of the executive branch is the Prime Minister’s Office; on the constitutional/representative plane, it is the Presidency.

• Head of State (President): The President is not elected by popular vote; instead, they are elected indirectly through the National Parliament (Jatiyo Shangsad). The term of office is 5 years and may be extended once.
• Government and Executive (Prime Minister): The Prime Minister is generally the leader of the political movement that wins a majority in parliament and is appointed by the President. The Prime Minister is the principal executive actor in the country’s day-to-day administration and in policy-making processes.
• Legislature (Jatiyo Shangsad – National Parliament): The legislative body is called the Jatiyo Shangsad and consists of 350 seats in total:
  • 300 seats: Determined by direct election from constituencies.
  • 50 seats (women’s quota): Elected indirectly through parliamentarians and serves as a mechanism to strengthen representation reserved for women.
• Term of office: The term of office for members of parliament is 5 years.

Note: In this framework, because election results directly determine the composition of the legislature, the formation of the government and the direction of the executive are shaped largely by the parliamentary majority.

Prepared by: Ahmet Deveci

According to the results, for the first time a single party won a majority large enough to amend the Constitution on its own. The LDP—generally Japan’s leading party over the past 70 years—delivered the most successful election in its history at a time when it had been losing public trust due to scandals. Increasing its number of seats by 125 compared to the previous term and reaching 316, the LDP’s pre-election coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), became the third-largest party with 36 seats. Thus, the governing bloc reached an overwhelming majority of 352 seats, while 8 opposition parties shared the remaining 113 seats.

The Process That Led Japan to a Snap Election

The background to the snap general election in Japan is rooted in a deep legitimacy crisis within the ruling LDP. The slush-fund scandal that surfaced in 2023 and implicated many senior figures in the party caused an unprecedented erosion of trust in Japanese politics. The revelation that more than 80 LDP lawmakers improperly reported political donation income between 2018 and 2022 led to the resignation of four cabinet members; in the subsequent 2024 House of Representatives and 2025 House of Councillors elections, a significant share of candidates involved in the scandal suffered heavy defeats at the ballot box. While opinion polls showed that more than 80% of voters directly attributed the LDP’s losses to this scandal, a sharp decline in donation revenues also increased internal and external pressure on the party. These developments triggered the process that led to then–Prime Minister Kishida Fumio’s resignation on 1 October 2024.

Amid this deepening political crisis, Kishida’s successor Shigeru Ishiba resigned on 21 October 2025. With Ishiba’s resignation on 7 September, the LDP leadership was effectively left vacant; in the party leadership election held on 5 October, Sanae Takaichi was elected as the LDP’s first female party leader. Assuming the premiership on 21 October, Takaichi became the first female prime minister in Japanese history.

However, this leadership change also brought to the surface structural tensions that had been accumulating within the governing coalition for a long time. Indeed, on 10 October, Komeito leader Tetsuo Saito decided to withdraw his party from the coalition it had maintained with the LDP for 26 years, effectively ending the existing government architecture.

Following this development, Takaichi formed a new coalition with the JIP to restore political stability and established her government on 21 October. Meanwhile, a new political alignment emerged between the former coalition partner Komeito and the main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), under the name “Centrist Reform Alliance.” However, despite entering the election with strong ambitions, this alliance failed to deliver a performance that met public expectations.

The new government under Takaichi quickly realized that the LDP’s legitimacy problem in the public eye could not be overcome through a leadership change alone. In this context, despite her party’s difficult period, Prime Minister Takaichi adopted a “confidence renewal” strategy by taking political risks: she announced the decision to hold a snap election on 19 January and dissolved the House of Representatives on 23 January. This decision was interpreted as a concrete sign both of the search for a fresh start within the LDP and of an effort to rebuild eroded public trust through a democratic test. By contrast, the main opposition and the former coalition partner’s decision to contest the election together turned the snap election into not only a vote of confidence, but also a critical turning point in which new alliance-seeking within Japan’s political system was tested.

Takaichi’s Japan

After Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi came to power, the economic and political direction pursued has been based on a policy package that addresses sustainable fiscal discipline and strategic investment priorities together. While emphasizing sustainability in public finances, the Takaichi administration also defines as a core priority the uninterrupted financing of necessary investments in areas such as defense, infrastructure, and technology. In Japan—experiencing inflation for the first time in many years—financial markets will closely monitor how the balance will be managed between investment-led goals and the fight against inflation.

The unlimited parliamentary power secured under Takaichi’s leadership will also strengthen the government’s hand on defense spending—an issue that holds a top priority among Takaichi’s campaign promises and lies at the center of ongoing debates.

In foreign policy, the Takaichi government is expected to follow a line that prioritizes Japan’s influence in Asia and defines regional competition more explicitly. In this framework, it appears the country is entering a period in which strategic competition with China will intensify, while Japan–U.S. relations will further strengthen. Takaichi’s reportedly good relations with Donald Trump increase the likelihood of closer cooperation with Washington in security and defense. Accordingly, Japan’s foreign policy is gaining a more ambitious and geopolitically proactive orientation, aligned with rising defense spending and regional power projection.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN JAPAN

Form of Government: Constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy under the 1947 Constitution

Head of State (Symbolic): Emperor — constitutionally, the Emperor is solely the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, and has no executive or legislative authority.

Executive: Exercised by the Prime Minister—designated by the party or coalition holding the majority in parliament—and the Cabinet under the Prime Minister’s leadership. The Prime Minister is elected by the legislature, and the cabinet is politically accountable to parliament.

Legislature: Japan’s National Diet (Kokkai) is bicameral.

• House of Representatives (Shūgi-in) is one of the two chambers and is among the highest organs of the state. Core powers—such as the budget, legislation, and the selection of the prime minister—are concentrated in the House of Representatives. Members are elected for 4 years. It has 465 members.
• House of Councillors (Sangi-in) has 248 members, who serve 6-year terms. Half of the members are renewed every 3 years. It cannot be dissolved.

Judiciary: Judicial power is vested in independent courts with the authority of constitutional review.

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Bibliography:

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/8/pm-sanae-takaichis-party-set-for-majority-in-japan-parliamentary-elections

https://asia.nikkei.com/politics/japan-election

https://www.csis.org/analysis/japans-26-year-old-ruling-coalition-collapses

https://globalaffairs.org/commentary/analysis/what-takaichis-win-means-japans-foreign-policy-priorities

https://www.cfr.org/articles/political-realignment-and-the-2026-japanese-election-ii

https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d01210/

Date prepared: 25.02.2025

Sadık Harun Köksal